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This paper provides a simple model showing that the extent of competition in credit
markets is important in determining the value of lending relationships. Creditors are more likely
to finance credit constrained finns when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for
these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. The model has implications about
the availability and the price of credit as firms age in different markets. The paper offers
evidence for these implications from small business data. It concludes with conjectures on the
costs and benefits of liberalizing financial markets, as well as the timing of such reforms.
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and NBERIs it possiblefor finns facing competitivecreditmarketsto form strong ties to particular
creditors? Does the benefit to a firm of forming such relationships diminich when credit markets get more
competitive? There is a theoretical reason for believing that credit market competition may be inimical
to the formation of mutually beneficial relationships between firms and specific creditors. When a finn
is young or distressed, the potential for future cashflows from its projects may be high, while the actual
cash it generates is low. When evaluating the credit-worthiness of the firm, a creditor should take into
accountthe streamof future profits the firm may generate. When the credit market is competitive and
creditors cannot hold equityclaims, thelendercannotexpect to share in the future surplus of the firm.
Sheisconstrained to break even on aperiod by periodbasis because she would drive away business if
shechargeda rate above the competitive one. Since uncertainly about a firm's prospects is high when
the firmis young ordistressed, creditors ina competitivemarket may be forcedtochargea high interest
rateuntil theuncertainty is resolved. This can be extremely distortionary tothefirm'sincentivesand
may,infact,resultin the firmnot receiving credit at all. A monopolisticcreditor,on the other hand,
shares inthe future surplusgenerated bythe firmthroughthe futurerents she is ableto extract. Shecan
backtoad interest payments over time, subsidizing the firm when young or distressedandextractingrents
later. Consequently, she may be more willing to offer credit than a similarly placed tender in a
competitive market. In other words, credit market competition imposes constraints on the abilityof the
firm and creditor to intertemporally share surplus. This makes lending relationships less valuable to a firm
because it cannot expect to get, help when most in need.
The argument that relationships and competition are incompatible recurs in other sub-disciplines
in economics.' For instance, labor economists claim that a firm is more reluctant to invest in training
workers in a competitive labor market unless they post a bond, since workers can threaten to quitand
demand a competitive salary once they are trained (Becker 19751. While there is anecdotal evidencein
the financial press suggesting this kind of phenomenon is a reality, there is little formal supporting
evidence in the academic literature. This is partly because periods of increased competition are,in
general, also accompanied by other changes which may make relationshipsless valuable. It is thus
difficult to disentangle the effects. For example. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990]document thathigh quality Japanese firms moved away from their banks when the domestic bond markets were
liberalized. This movement may reflect the adverse effects of competition on relationships. Alternatively
this movement may simply reflect a reshuffling of borrowing by firms that previously did not have access
to public markets. The ideal test would examine the effects of competition on relationships in a situation
where firms are not simultaneously faced with a change in the sources of capital available to them.
In this paper, we focus our analysis on small businesses in the United States. Such firms
concentrate their external borrowing from banks [see Petersen and R.ajan 1994] and therefore the
confounding effect of the portfolio choice problem discussed above is minor. In different regions of the
country, the degree of competition between banks varies, partly because of restrictions on bank entry and
branching, partly because there is only so much banking business a local market can support. Thus, we
can isolate the effects of competition on relationships in this sample.
In the next section, we present a simple model which highlights the distinction between
competitive and concentrated credit markets, In section II, we describe the data and the empirical tests.
We find that significantly more young firms obtain external financing in concentrated markets than in
competitive markets. Underlying differences in firm quality across markets do not appear to explain the
differential access to capital. As the theory suggests, creditors smooth interest rates intertemporally in
more concentrated markets, which may explain why they are able to provide more finance. We conclude
in section 111 with policy implications and suggestions for ffiture research.
I. The Model
A. Agents andInvestmentOppanunities
Assume a risk neutral world where there are two types of agents looking for finance; good
entrepreneurs and bad entrepreneurs. At date 0, good entrepreneurs can choose either a safe project or
a risky project. A safe project pays out S at date 1 when amount 1 is invested in it. Furthermore, when
the project concludes the good entrepreneur will be able to invest i in another safe project which returns
2•Alternatively,if the good entrepreneur chooses to gamble at date 0, he can invest in the risky
project. At date 1, the risky project may succeed and pay outwithprobability p. orit may fail and
pay 0 with probability (l-p). If it succeeds, he can invest I in a safe project which pays It2 at date 2.
2In contrasttogoodentrepreneurs,the projects of bad entrepreneursare doomed to fail andreturn nothing
atdate j•3
We also makethe following assumptions:





A.1 is simply that the safe project has positive net present value (NPV) in this risk neutral world,
while A.2 implies the risky project has negative NPV. A.3 implies that the future positive NPV project
has the same expected returns and investment, regardless of whether the safe or risky project is chosen
at date 0. Finally, A.4 implies that the revenue from the date-fl project is insufficient to finance the
project at date 1.
B. Finance.
Financial institutions are the only source of external finance in this market. For simplicity, we
call these institutions banks. Agents know whether they are good or bad entrepreneurs. At date 0, banks
only know that a fraction 0 of the agents that demand finance are good entrepreneurs. Thus 0 is a measure
of the ex-ante credit quality of the agents. A number of studies suggest that a lending bank learns a lot
about the kind of entrepreneur it is dealing with over the course of its re!ationship with the entrepreneur
[for example, see the evidence in Lummer and McConnell 1989. and Petersen and Rajan 1994].
Therefore,we assume that at date 1 the bank becomes fully informed about the kind of agent with whom
it is dealing. We also assume that for regulatory reasons banks can only hold debt claims, that is,
contracts which require a fixed repayment by the borrower.4 Due to the difficulty of describing
investments or the character of the entrepreneur to courts, contracts cannot be made contingent on the
project taken or the type of agent. Finally, the bank can charge a rate such that its expected return on
loans is M. Mis a measure of the market power the bank has. In this risk neutral world where the risk
3free rate is zero, we get perfect competition in the credit market when M equals 1, whIlea bankhas
market power when M is greater than 1. For simplicity, we assume6
(A.5) -i>M￿1.
'Is
Theborrowing process is as follows: the agent (the good or bad entrepreneur) goes to a bank and
indicates how much he wants to borrow and for what maturity. The bank responds by quoting an interest
rate which will give it an expected return less than or equal to M. If no interest rate gives the bank an
expected return greater than or equal to its cost of funds (=1),it turns down the loan. In what follows,
we determine how the quality of firms getting financed, and the amount they pay for credit over time,
varies with the bank's market power.
C.Solving the Model.
-
Thisproblemisa straightforward application of Diamond [1989] and Stiglitz and Weiss [1981)?
At date0,good entrepreneurs cannot distinguish themselves from bad ones. Therefore, they can borrow
only at a rate which compensates the bank for possible losses if the entrepreneur turns out to be bad. The
higher interest rate can distort the entrepreneur's incentives and persuade him to choose the risky project.
Thus adverse selection can cause moral hazard which in turn can lead to credit rationing.
To see this, first note that good entrepreneurs will try to reduce their own cost of borrowing by
asking for terms that help expose the bad entrepreneurs. A bad entrepreneur will have no choice but to
ask for the same terms at date 0. Since bad entrepreneurs have no new projects at date 1. the bank will
not give them new money unless it has contracted to do so. Knowing this, good entrepreneurs will
borrow as little as possible at date 0, so they can take advantage of the lower rate at date 1 when the bad
entrepreneurs have been exposed. Therefore, a good entrepreneur will seek to borrow only 1 at date 0.
Without loss of generality, we assume that he proposes to repay amount D1 at date 1, after which he will
contract a new loan for any subsequent project.'
If the good entrepreneur chooses the safe project at date 0, at date 1 he must borrow
4(1) —
(S1 — D1).
He can now borrow at the riskfree full-information rate M.9 If the good entrepreneur chooses the safe






Similarly, his expected profit if he chooses the risky project is
(3) max{p{R2—M[I—(R1—D1)I},O}.




For the bank to lend at date-U, two conditions must be satisfied. First the loan must be structured so that
the good entrepreneur has the incentive to take the safe project. This is inequality (4). In addition, the
bank must expect to recover its date-U investment I. Taking into account the profit it can make by
charging the maximum interest rate on loans made at date-i, this implies that the bank will lend only if
IM-1 (5) $M M(I—S).
Using (4) and (5),onlyentrepreneurs with credit quality greater than
(6) 9C(M) =___________________________
M(S —pR1)+(M—l)(I —1 )(I—P)
will get financed.
Result 1. As the market power M of the bank increases, firms with lower credit quality obtain finance.
The intuition is straightforward. As the market power of the bank increases, it can extract a larger
share of the future surplus generated by the firm. This implicit equity stake in the firm enables it to set
a lower interest rate for the initial project (compared to a more competitive situation). The surplus
extracted in the future does not affect the firm's choice between projects (see equation (4)),butthe lower
5initial rate give the firm an incentive to take the safe project. Consequently, firms of lowerquality can
be profitably financed.
The interest rate charged for funds lent at date I is M. Rut at date 0, the face valuedemanded,
D1 is bounded by:
IM S—pR M—1 (7)
rnin[_!__,il_p
Thefirst argument of the minimum function is the limit set on the interest rateby the bank's market
power, while the second is the limit set by moral hazard. The term after the second inequality is the
bank'sindividual rationalitycondition. For the lowest quality firm financed by the bank with market
power M, the binding upper limit on the interest rate is moralhazard. Thelower bindingconstraint is
the bank's individual rationality condition which depends on M. Therefore,
Result 2. The initial interest rate contracted by the lowestquality finn fmanced by a bank with market
power M is lower than it would be if such a firm were to be financed by a bank with
market power M' where M > M'.
Finally, let t be the ratio of the face value charged per dollar lent at date 1 to the face value
charged per dollar lent at date 0. This is the ratio of gross interest rates. Then forany initial credit quality
0andbanks with market power M and M' where M> M',
(8)
:(M)￿ t(M")
Ina population of firms where 0haspositive density everywhere on [0.11,
(9) Average( t(M)) > Average( t(M'))
Result 3. On average, the relative decline in demandedrepayments as the finn gets older is lower when
the bank has more market power.
D.Caveats: Contractual Remedies.
Our mainpoint, similar to Townsend [1982) and Gertler [1992], is that multi-period state
contingent contracts allow formoreefficient contracting than single or multiperiod fixed payoff contracts.
6In the environment we analyze, backloaded state contingent interest payments are less distortionary than
frontloaded fixed interest payments.Acreditor with market power can convert the latter into the former,
which is why efficiency increases with creditor market power. There are obvious caveats.
We have abstracted from a variety of contracts which could commit the firm to sharing surplus
with the lender, even in a competitive environment. For example, we have assumed that regulators do
not allow creditors to hold equity claims. However, equity contracts may not be feasible even if allowed,
since dividend payments are voluntary. Diamond [1984] and Hart and Moore [1989] specify environments
where firm's management will never voluntarily pan with cash. One way to force management to pay
out cash in these environments is through debt contracts. Another way that we emphasize above is for
a supplier to have market power in an essential input (credit) which enables it to extract cash from the
firm. Thus the implicit equity stake that market power confers may be feasible even when explicit equity
stakes are not.
The reader may wonder why long term debt contracts between the firm and the bank in the
competitive environment cannot replicate the same payments over time as those determined by market
power. The reason, quite simply, is that the payments due on the long term debt do not — and cannot —
vary with the project taken. The share of the surplus the bank gets by virtue of its market power does,
however, vary. The firm has to pay more to the bank if the risky (but a-post profitable) project
succeeds. This reduces the owner's incentive to shift risk)0 This also explains why contracts which
require a high initial payment, and then commit the bank to relending at a lower-than-competitive rate
will not work. These contracts have the effect of making the firm's payments conditional on the risky
project succeeding lower and thus increase the firm's incentive to shift risk.
Within the class of debt contracts, however, complicated bonding contracts could commit the firm
to sharing surplus. For example, the entrepreneur could commit to asking the bank for a loan at date 1
(giving it a 'first-right-of-refusal') at a pre-deterntined high rate." There may be practical difficulties
in enforcing such a contract, primarily because the successful firm in a competitive credit market can
easily find ways of borrowing without violating the letter of the 'first-right-of-refusal' contract. For
instance, the entrepreneur could take out a personal loan from another source, collateralized by the shares
7of the firm, or sell equity and use theproceeds to repay the highpriced loan. A contract ruling out such
contingencies would be costly to write and difficult to enforce. Another problem is that having bonded
the entrepreneur, the bank has no incentive to offer good service. Finally, it ispossible that a populist
legal system may refuse to enforce contracts which appear (ex post) to be extortionary. Thus bilateral
opportunism or political realities may make these contracts impractical.
We have also abstracted from the distortions to the firm's investment incentives createdby the
bank'smarketpower. Even if these are large, results 1, 2, and 3 will continue to hold so long as the bank
can contractually dispose of its ability to extract future rents, as for example, bysigning a loan
commitment contract. The contract would need a 'material adverse change' clauseallowing the bank to
deny credit to bad entrepreneurs. While such contracts are observed, opportunismmay again make them
impractical.
In summary, the theory is ambiguous on whether the problemwe have described can be
effectively contracted around, though casual empiricism (see note 2)suggests it cannot. The test of
whether it is important, however, must be an empirical one.
II. Data and Empirical Investigation
A.SampleDescription
Thedata in this study are obtained from the National Survey of Small Business Finances.The
survey was conducted in 1988-89 under the guidance of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the US Small Business Administration. It targeted non-financial, non-farm small businesses
which were in operation as of December, 1987. Financial datawas collected only for the last fiscal year.
The finns in the survey are small —fewerthan 500 employees. The sample was stratified by census
region (Northeast, North Central, South, and West), urban/rural location (whether the firmwas located
in a MSA), and by employment size (less than 50employees, 50-100 employees, more than 100
employees). The stratification was done to ensure that large and rural firms were represented in the
sample. The response rate was seventy to eighty percent, dependingupon the section of the questionnaire
considered.'2
8There are 3404 firms in the sample, of which 1875 are corporations (including Scorporations)
and 1529 are partnerships or sole proprietorships. In the overall sample, the mean firm size in tern's of
book assets is $1.05 million; the median size is $130,000. The firms have mean sales of $2.6 million and
median sales of $300,000. These companies are also fairly young, having spent a median of 10years
under their current ownership.In comparison, farms inthe largest decile of NYSE stocks have been listed
for a median of at least 33 years. Nearly 90 percent of these firms are owner managed, 12percent are
owned by women and 7 percent by minorities. Over 19 percent of the sample consists of firms in the
hotel and restaurant business. Another 13 percent are in building and construction, 7 percent manufacture
intermediate products like chemicals, and 7 percent perform communication, electric, gas and sanitary
services.
On average, firms in the sample have a debt to asset ratio of 0.33. Of the debt, approximately
80 percent is from institutions while the rest consists of loans from the owners (in the cases of
partnerships or corporations) and the owner's family. Banks account for 80 percent of the institutional
lending, and non- bank fmancial institutions about 15 percent.'3 On average, trade credit financing is
10 percent of total assets, or about a third of the size of debt.
B. Sources of Market Power -
Inorder to proceed further, we must determine proxies for the bank's market power. Note that
nothing in our analysis requires the market power to be present a ante. One possibility then is that the
bank obtains market power cx post from the private information it obtains about the firm during the
course of the lending relationship. The problem with this kind of local monopoly is that it would dissipate
as the firm gets older and better known by the credit market. A second problem is that firms who find
it hard to get credit are likely to offer their banks a local monopoly, m2king the choice endogenous.
Finally, it is empirically hard to quantify the extent of information asymmetries about the firm between
the inside lender and the outside credit market.
9Mother sourceofmarket power is the spatial distribution of banks in the local market. Banks
that are physicallycloser to thefirm have lower costs of monitoring and transacting with the finn. These
costs may be especially significant because the firms in our sample are small. If other banks arerelatively
far, close banks have considerable market power. The concentration of banks in the localgeographicaJ
market is likely to be a proxy for how far competing lenders are likely to be fromone other, and
consequently how much market power any single lender has. Another way to think about this is that the
search costs to a firm of finding a replacement lender who has the ability to deal with itsspecific needs
are likely to be high when the local market has few lenders.
In what follows, we use the concentration of lenders in the local marketas a measure of the
tender's market power. Implicit in the analysis that follows is thefollowing assumption: variations
between local markets in the market power banks have because of their concentration inthe local markets
is much larger than variations between local markets in the amount of 'homemade'market power that
firms voluntarily offer banks by giving them an informationmonopoly. If this were not true, our tests
would be biased against finding any effect of spatial concentrationon lending.
From the F.D.I.C. Summary of Deposit data, the SBAsurvey obtained the Herfmdahl index of
commerciaj bank deposit concentration for the county or Metropolitan Statistical Areawhere the firm is
headquartered. The survey, however, reported only a broad categorization ofcompetition in the local
credit market. The survey reports whether the Herfindalil index is less than0.1, between 0.1 and 0.18,
or greater than 0.18. We refer to the first category as the most competitive creditmarket, and the last
category as the most concentrated credit market.
In what follows, we take the concentration of the market fordeposits to be a proxy for the
concentration of the market for credit. This would be a goodapproximation if the firms in our sample
largely borrow from local markets because of the prohibitive informational andtransactional costs of
going outside. While there is evidence in prior work [see Hannan1991] of this, we have independent
toconfirmation thatcreditmarketsfor small firms are local." The firms in our sample report the distance
to their primary financial institution. Over half the firms are within 2 miles of their primary institution.
Ninety percent of the firms are within 15 miles of their primary institution.
If the Herfindahi index for deposits is a good proxy for competition in the loan market, we would
expect to find greater solicitationof new business by financialinstitutions in more competitive markets.
For firms less than ten years old, 32 percent of the finns in the most competitive market have been
approached by at least one financial institution seeking new business in the past year. Only 26 percent
of the firms in the least competitive market were solicited. The difference in solicitation rates is
marginally significant at the 13 percent level. The difference in solicitation rates is greater, both
economically and statistically, for the older finns. For finns which are more than ten years old the
solicitation rates are 31 percent in the most concentrated market and 46 percent in the most competitive
market. This difference (statistically significant at the one percent level) is, therefore, greatest for older
firms where the model argues competition is most destructive to relationships.
Solicitation of new financial business from the firms in this sample is once again a local
phenomenon. Of the firms which were solicited for new business, over half report that the soliciting
financial institution is within 3 miles of the finn. All this suggests that the Herfindahl index of deposits
is a good measure of credit market competition. Before examining the data, it may be useful to restate
our empirical predictions in terms of this proxy.
C. Empirical implications
The empirical predictions of the model are the following:
a. Provided the distribution of firm qualities is similar in all markets and provided that in at least
one market some firms do not obtain finance, relatively more firms should be able to obtain credit from
financial institutions in areas where credit markets are more concentrated. Furthermore, the average
quality of firms obtaining finance should be lower as the credit market becomes more concentrated.
11b. Creditshould be cheaperfor the lowest qualityfirmsin a concentratedcreditmarket than if
similarfirms were toobtain creditina morecompetitive market.
c.The cost of creditshould fall faster as a firm ages in a competitive creditmarketthan in a
concentratedmarket.
D. Credit Market Competition and Finn Quality
Thetheory makes strong predictions about how borrowing will vary with firm age and market
concentration. The sample we have is a cross section. However, by examining firms of differentages,
we canmakeinferences about how borrowing changes over a finn's life} The first prediction is that
if the quality distribution of firms applying for credit is the same in the differentmarkets, firms of lower
average quality (and, consequently, relatively more firms) will be financed in more concentrated markets.
We first describe the differences in quality of all the firms in the different markets in Table I.Thus this
table is based on both those firms which borrow from institutional sources and those which donot.
We divide the data into two subsamples — firmsyounger than the median age of ten years and
finns older than the median age. There are 296 firms in the mostcompetitive credit markets and 2037
in the most concentrated markets. Firms in the two markets areapproximately the same size as measured
by the book value of total assets, with the median size ofyoung finns being $102,000 and $103,000.
There is greater disparity between the mean size ofyoung firms ($863,000 in competitive markets and
$569,000 in concentrated ones) but the difference is not statisticallysignificant. Finns in the middle
category (Herftndahl index between 0.10 and 0.18) are larger but not statistically so.
The young firms in the more competitive credit marketsare somewhat more profitable. The ratio
of gross profits (revenues less cost of goods sold) to assets is 2.78 in thecompetitive market and 1.88
in the most concentrated markets, •The medians differ in similarways. Moving on to operating profit
ratios, again finns in the most competitive market are more profitable (amean ratio of 1.14 versus 0.63).
although the difference is no longer statistically different. The median ratiosare even closer (0.17 versus
120.15). The rates of sales growth do not differ much across the markets (see Table I).
A firm's access to capital may depend upon the tangibility and/or the liquidity of its assets. The
industry the firm is in should be a good proxy for this. As is typical for small firms, a significant fraction
of our sample are in the retail trade and services industry. However, over ten percent of the finns are
in construction and another ten percent of the firms are in manufacturing. The distribution of firms across
industries is very similar in the most concentrated and the most competitive markets (see Figure I). The
most competitive markets have relatively fewer finns in services and somewhat more in wholesale trade
but the fractions of firms in the other industries are roughly equal across markets. In sum, the quality of
firms in the most competitive market appears as good if not better than the quality of firms in the most
concentrated market. Our results should be biased --ifat all —towardsfinding more institutional
financing in competitive areas.'6
Finally, it is useful to ask whether the concentration of credit markets is correlated with the
region of the country. This is important to ensure that we do not pick up the effects of a regional shock
in what follows. A cross tabulation of the region in which the firm is located (Northeast, North Central,
South, and West) and the level of competition in the local credit market (we do not report this in a table)
indicates that firms in thesouthern andwestern regions are under-represented in the most competitive
market and over-represented in the mostconcentratedmarkets. However,themagnitude of these
differences is small. The correlations between the Herfindahl index and each ofthefourregiondummies
rangesfrom-0.12 to 0.15.
E.Credit Market Conipetizion andthe Availability of Finance
Thetheoryinthe previous section suggests that young firms are more likely to receive
institutional finance in a concentrated credit market than in competitive one. Among the youngest half
of oursample(firms which are less than tenyearsold),the firmsinthe mostconcentrated market are
13more likely to obtain capital from institutional sources (see Table 11). Sixty five percent of the firms in
the most concentrated markethave institutional debt compared to only 55 percentof firms in the most
competitive market, with the difference being significant at the 1 percent level. Ten year old firms may
not be considered young. As Table II demonstrates, the difference in institutional financing is most
extreme among firms which are four years old or less. Forty eight percent of such firms in the most
competitive market have institutional debt compared to 65percentof the firms in the most concentrated
market. The difference is again statistically significant at the one percent level. The potential effects of
a survival bias (see section 11 H) on our results will be smallest for the youngest firms in our sample. Yet
in this part of our sample, the differential access to capital is the largest.
As firms grow older, the difference in the fraction of firms being financed in the two markets
vanishes. For firms that are older than 10 years, approximately 61 percent use institutional finance,
irrespective of the state of competition in credit markets (see Table 11).
The differences in the fraction of young firms with institutional debt does not arise because linus
in a concentrated market borrow less. The institutional debt to assets ratio foryoung firms which have
institutional debt is slightly higher in concentrated markets —0.42 compared to 0.35. For finns older than
ten years, the numbers are reversed. The institutional debt to asset ratio is 0.43 in the most competitive
market and only 0.35 in the most concentrated market. As finns get older in the concentrated market,
they borrow smaller amounts from these outside sources and rely more on equity and internal funds. This
is consistent with our model. If borrowers in such markets are offered lower-than-competitive rates when
young, this subsidy must be made up by charging them a higher-than-competitive rate when old. This will
encourage them, at the margin, to substitute away from external borrowing when old.
In our discussion so far, we have implicitly assumed that the amount of institutional debt used
is the amount of debt available to the firm. Such an assumption is,perhaps, defensible for the youngest
firms which may have few internal sources of funds aiximany lucrative investment opportunities. For
14older firms it is less clear whether the amount of institutional debt is supply constrained (creditors do not
want to lend more) or demand constrained (borrowers prefer internal sources). That older firms borrow
less in concentrated markets does not necessarily indicate that these firms are more supply constrained.
In order to explore this issue further, we turn to a better measure of credit availability.
P. An Akernojive Measure of Credit Availability
If financial institutions limit thecreditextended to a finn, the firm will borrow from more
expensive non-institutional sources as long as the returns from its investments exceed the cost of funds
from those sources. Correcting for investment opportunities, the amount of expensive borrowing should
be a measure of how much the firm is rationed by the (cheaper) institutional sources —providedthe
following conditions hold. First, the marginal cost of borrowing from the non-institutional source must
exceed the marginal cost of available institutional credit. If it did not, the firm would turn to non-
institutional sources of credit first. Second, the cost of borrowing from the non-institutional source should
be relatively similar for finns within an identifiable class.
Most of the firms in our sample are offered trade credit —shortterm financing which some
suppliers provide with their goods and services. As reported in Table lii, the median finn in all three
kinds of markets obtains 90 percent of its purchases on credit. Another measure of the firm's use of trade
credit is its Days Payable Outstanding (DPO) —whichis defined as 365 times the firm's accounts
payables divided by its cost of goods sold. The median firm's DPO is about 15 days across the markets.
We have data on the percentage of discounts for early payment which are taken by each firm. In general.
discounts for early payment are substantial and are meant to encourage the finn to pay on time. For
example, firms in the retail business refer to tenns as the 10-2-30 rule. This is a discount of 2 percent
if the bill is paid within 10 days and the full amount if paid in 30 days. A firm that passes up the discount
and the bill when due pays an annualized rate of 44.6 percent, far higher than the highest interest rate
charged to firms in our sample)'
15Previous work indicates that discount terms are not specific to a firm, but are commonpractice
throughout the industry [Elliehausen and Wolken, 1992, Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Furthermore,
although the decisiontooffer trade credit depends upon the firm's quality, the decision by trade creditors
to offer early payment discounts does not. Approximately thirty-three percent of trade credits are
accompanied by early payment discounts. This number does not vary with firm size or firmage. As these
discounts and penalties are substantial and are industry- not firm-specific, the fraction of trade discounts
not taken is a good proxy for the costly non-institutional credit source.
By this measure, fewer finns appear to be credit constrained in concentrated markets than in
competitive markets (see Table Ill). Only 19 percent of firms in concentrated markets take fewer than
10 percent of offered discounts, compared to 29 percent in the middle market and 33percent in the most
competitive market. Conversely, over 59 percent of finns in the most concentrated market takemore than
90 percent of offered discounts, compared to 52 percent in the middle market and 50percent in the most
competitive market.
Clearly, these monotonic relationships are only suggestive since they do not control for firm
quality or other factors which may be correlated with credit market concentration. To test the robustness
of these results, we regress the percentage of trade discounts takenagainst measures of the finn's
investment opportunities, its cashflow, measures of the strength of its lendingrelationships, and the state
of competition in credit markets. Firms which take a largerpercent of their early payment discounts
should be less credit constrained. We include three measures of the firm's investmentopportunities.
Investment opportunities may depend on the firm's size — the book value of itsassets — and the log of
the firm's age (younger firms may have better opportunities). Since investmentopportunities depend on
the industry the firm is in, seven industry dummies are included asexplanatory variables. Clearly, all
these variables may also proxy for the credit quality of the firm.
The firm's internal cash flow is accounted for by including income after interest normalizedby
16the finn's book value of assets. We include a dummy for whether the firm is a corporation or not,
becanse credit rationing should be greaterfor firmswith limited liability. An owner managed firm has
a greater incentive to take on risky projects if it has limited liability. Petersen and Rajan [1994] find that
the strength of relationships between firms and financial institutions are an important determinant of
whether firms rely on trade credit financing. This is why we include the measures of relationships: the
log of the length of the longest relationship the firm has had with a financial institution, the fraction of
borrowingthatcomesfrom institutionsthat provide at least one significant financial service to the firm,
and the number ofinstitutionsthat account for more than 10 percent of the firm's borrowing.
Finally,we includeanindicator ifthe firm is inthemost concentrated creditmarket.If
availability doesnot dependonthe concentrationofthe credit market, the coefficient for this term should
be zero.
The dependent variable in the regression should be the desired fraction of early payment discounts
which the firm would like to take. Firms that are rationed by financial institutions will choose to borrow
front trade creditors at the rates implicit in foregoing the early payment discount. In fact, they may wish
to borrow more than is offered through their trade credits. Thus the desired percentage may be less than
zero. Since firms cannot take less than 0 or more than 100 percent of the early payment discounts, the
observed dependent variable is censored at 0 and 100 percent. In our sample, 60 percent of the firms are
censored at 0 or 100. Estimating the model with ordinary least squares ignores this censoring, and
consequently, estimates will be biased toward zero. We, therefore, estimate a tobit regression with two
sided limits.
In Table IV we examine the determinants of the percent of offered discounts taken by the firm.
The estimates in column I indicate that the investment and cashflow variables have the predicted sign.
Older and larger firms have fewer investment opportunities and so can take more trade discounts by
paying on time. If age and size proxy for credit quality, this result suggests that higher quality firms are
17less likely to be credit rationed. Profitable firms have more internal cash so they are less likely to use
trade credit as a means of tong term borrowing. Again, this may be a proxy for quality. Finally, because
of their limited liability, corporations are more likely to take risky projects, which explains why they are
more likelyto be rationed.
The relationship variables also have the predicted signs. A long relationship with a financial
institution increases the percentage of discounts taken, even holding the age of the firm constant.
Borrowing a greater fraction from lenders who provide the firm services has a similar effect, although
this effect is not statistically significant. Borrowing from multiple institutions makes relationships more
diffused and increases the degree to which the firm is credit constrained.
The degree of concentration in financial markets enters in an economically and statistically
significant way. A firm in the most concentrated market takes 17 percentage points more trade credit
discounts than do finns in most competitive credit markets (t=2.9). This coefficient is forty percent of
standard deviation of the percentage of discounts taken. In other words, after controlling for observable
measures of credit demand and credit worthiness, we find firms in the most concentrated credit market
are the least credit rationed.
An alternative explanation for our results is that credit constraints are less binding in small towns.
Information about small businesses and their managers may be more available, or thepressure to repay
debts may be greater, in rural areas. This should make credit rationing less severe. The correlation
between our measure of credit market concentration and whether the firm is in a Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) is 0.44. The estimated coefficient for the indicator variable for MSA in Table IV column
I is less than half that for the concentration indicator (fl=-7.4)andstatistically small (t= 1.4). However,
when we drop the indicator for SMSA from the estimation, the coefficient on the concentration indicator
increases from 16.5 to 19.7. Thus the rural/urban divide has some effect in the predicted direction, but
this does not account for the influence of concentration.
18Another possibility is that the Herfindahl index is correlated with whether the firm is located in
a state witha unitbanking law. These states may have been especially affected by regionai shocks —for
instance, to the oil or natural resources industries —whichin turn may have affected the entire regional
economy) Thus firms in competitive markets may be credit constrained not because the markets are
competitive, but because they are in states affected by adverse regional shocks. The empirical facts are
not, however, consistent with this alternative hypothesis. First, if the firms in competitive markets have
been affected by regional shocks, then their profitability and sales should be affected by the shock. As
is apparent in Table I, the firms in competitive markets have profit to assets ratios which are at least as
large if not larger than the firms in the most concentrated markets. Sales growth for firms in the most
concentrated market is the same as sales growth for firms in the most competitive market. Thus sales and
profits of firms in these markets do not reflect adverse shocks.
A more direct test of this hypothesis is to control for the banking laws of the state in which each
firm is located. This is done in the second column of Table IV. Firms in unit banking states are less
credit constrained (=9.3),although this coefficient is not statistically different from zero (t=O.9). More
importantly, including a control for firms in unit banking states has only a marginal effect on the
coefficient of the indicator variable for concentration. This coefficient actually rises from 16.5 to 17.1.
Given the low correlation between the firm being located in a unit banking states and it being located in
the most concentrated market =-O.O7), this finding is not surprising.
The evidence presented so far suggests that controlling for the observable measures of quality,
firms in more concentrated credit markets are less credit constrained. The remaining portion of this
section adds additional controls to the model to test the robustness of this finding and the accuracy of our
assumptions. First, we have assumed that the firm's investment opportunities do not differ systematically
with the concentration of the credit markets. The potential problem is that firms in more competitive
credit markets may have greater investment opportunities and thus take fewer early payment discounts.
19As an additional control for investment opportunities we include the firm's sales growth, since intuitively
firms with highersales growthshould also have more investment opportunities. The data, however, does
not indicate that concentration proxies for differences in investment opportunities. The coefficient on the
firm's sales growth is small and has die wrong sign. Firms with higher sales growth are slightly less
credit constrained. In addition, the effect on the concentration coefficient is small. The coefficient on the
Herfindahi index rises from 16.5 to 16.8 (see Table IV —columnIII).
An alternative way of correcting for differences in industry profits, investment opportunities, and
terms of trade credit in the industry is to include more detailed industry dummies. Instead of the seven
industry dummies -.representingone-digit S.l.C. codes —weinclude indicators for all two digit S.l.C.
industries that account for more than 1 percent of the sample. We lose a number of degrees of freedom,
and the concentration coefficient falls slightly to 14.5 (estimates not reported in table) but is still
statistically significant (t=2.5).
The model in the previous section argues that the greater the lender's marketpower, the less
credit constrained the borrower will be. So far, we have focussed on the differences between themost
concentrated market and the other markets. But as Table H Indicates, there seems to be a monotonic
increase in the fraction of finns getting credit as we move across the three broadranges for the
Herfindahi. To test the monotonicity of this relationships in the trade creditregression, we add an
additional dummy variable for the lirms in the most competitive market. These estimatesare reported in
column IV of Table IV.
According to the model, the coefficient on the most competitive market dummy should be
negative since these firms should be more credit constrained than the intermediate market which is the
base. Instead the coefficient is positive. However, the coefficient is notstatistically different from zero
(t =1.1).Since our controls for relationships, such as the relationship length, dependupon the
concentration of the credit market, we 'nay be double counting. Interestingly, when we drop the
20relationship variables, the coefficient on the most competitive market drops to 3.7 (t=O.4). Thus we
cannot distinguish the most competitive market from the middle market, although we can distinguish the
most concentrated market from the other two.
Our inability to distinguish the estimates may be because the difference in credit availability
between markets diminishes as firms become older and more established. Unfortunately the data are not
discriminating enough for us to detect this phenomenon in the trade credit regressions. When we include
both dummy variable for different levels of credit market competition and interactions with the firm's age
(estimates not reported), the standard errors grow dramatically. However, we report means and medians
of the percent of early payment discounts taken by firms in different markets in Table V. As expected
from the model,wefind that for young firms (age less than the median), the median discounts taken is
related to the concentration of the market. The difference in medians is 10 percent higher in the middle
market than in the most competitive market, and 30 percent higher in the most concentrated market than
inthemiddle market. For the old firms, these differences vanish. The means follow a similar pattern,
and unlike the medians, the differences in means are statistically significant.'
To summarize, we find that the amount firms borrow from financial institutions tends to increase
with the concentration of the credit markets. When we examine a measure of availability of institutional
finance rather than actual usage, we find that young firms appear less constrained in more concentrated
markets. Regression estimates suggest that firms in the most concentrated market appear to be
significantly less credit constrained than firms in the other two markets. The evidence is largely consistent
with the theory proposed in section 1. However to establish that the greater availability is because lenders
in concentrated credit markets intertemporally smoothing interest rates, we now turn to analyze interest
rates.
G. Cost ofCapita!DWerences in Competitive and Conce.'uiwed Markets
Ourmodel suggests that in markets where lenders have market power, they should charge a
21lower-than-competitive interest rate early in a finn's life, when problems of moral hazard and adverse
selection are large. Later, they will compensate by demanding an interest rate above the competitive rate.
For this reason, we expect the interest rate to fall more rapidly in competitive markets.
To test these predictions, we examine a subset of 1277 firms for which we have the interest rate
charged on the firm's most recent loan. This is described in Table VI. The avenge interest rate is
calculated for both the young (age less than 10 years) and old firms in the most concentrated and most
competitive markets. Young firms pay higher average rates than old firms, but the pace at which the rate
declines is larger in the most competitive market. In the most concentrated market the young finnspay
34 basis points more than old firms (t2. 17); however in the most competitive market this difference is
86 basis points. Notice that the interest rate starts higher in the competitive market and ends lower. This
result is inconsistent with the argument that market concentration is a proxy for town size and the
associated access to information. If this were true, rates should be uniformly lower in the concentrated
market, not just for the youngest firms.
These results are only suggestive. We have made no adjustment for observable finn quality.
According to the model in the previous section, lenders will lend money, on avenge, to lower quality
finns in the more concentrated markets. Thus the difference in rates above betweenyoung firms in
competitive and concentrated markets may understate the difference we should expect to find once we
control for observable measures of quality.
To control for other factors which affect the interest rate a firm pays and to test the robustness
of our findings, we estimate the loan rate as a function of the log of the firm'sage and controls for
observable firm and loan characteristics. In the regression results below we use the prime rate to control
for changes in the underlying cost of capital. The prime rate includes both the risk free rateas well as
a default premium for the bank's best customers. Since these small businesses are not the bank's best
customers, they pay an additional default premium. We control for aggregate variations in this premium
22by including the difference between yield on corporate bonds rated BAA and the yield on ten year
government bonds. We also include a term premium, defined as the yield on a government bond of the
same maturity as the loan minus the treasury bill yield, to account for interest rate differences across
different loan maturities.For floatingrate loans this variable is set to zero.
To control for variation in the loan rate due to the characteristicsof the loan we include dununies
for whether it is a floating rate loan, for the kind of collateral offered, and for the type of lender making
the loan. To control for variation in the loan rate due to the characteristics of the firm we include the
firm's size (book value of assets), dummies for the firm's industry, and whether the firm is incorporated.
We also include the relationship variables used by Petersen and Rajan [1994].
Sincewe expect firm age to have a different effect in competitive and concentrated markets, we
estimate different age intercepts and slopes for each level of market concentration. The intercept measures
the difference between a loan in the most concentrated and the most competitive market, when the firm
is new. As Table VII shows, firms in the most concentrated market start out at an interest rate which is
129 basis points lower than in the most competitive market. Interest rates drop as the firm grows older,
consistent with Diamond's [19891 notion that survival is a signal about the true quality of the borrower.
The rate at which the loan rates drop, however, differs significantly across markets. The coefficient on
age is over four times larger in the most competitive markets (1-Ierfindahl index<O.1O) than in the most
concentrated markets (Herfindahi index >0.18). As a firm ages from new to the median age of ten years.
its interest rate drops by 167 basis points in a competitive market. The interest raze drops only 36 basis
points for firms in the most concentrated markets (see Figure U). In addition to being large in
magnitudes, the difference in the slopes are also statistically significant (t=2.O). The fact that the slope
of interest rates with age is flatter in concentrated markets is a direct implication of the our model.
While it is interesting that interest rates stan out lower for finns in the most concentrated area,
it is not necessarily a prediction of our theory. Our theory only suggests that new firms of the lowest
23quality should obtain a lower loan rate in a concentratedmarket, it has nothing to sayaboutthe raze
charged to the avera2e new firm. The average loan raze in the concentrated market will be affected by
both a highermarkupcharged to higher quality new firms (M> 1) - which will tend to raise the average
interest rate - and lower than competitive rates charged to low quality young firms - which wilt reduce
it. The average effect depends on the distribution of firms. This may explain why the intercept is not
monotonic, being even lower for firms in markets of intermediate concentration than in the most
concentrated area (-1.70 and -1.29). But the slope coefficient in the intermediate market is not statistically
or economically different from that for the most concentrated area (-0.135 vs. -0.154).
As discussed in section 1fF., market concentration is correlated with the urban/rural location of
the firm. As further evidence chat concentration is not a proxy for the location of the firm, we re-estimate
our rate regressions allowing the slopes to differ for firms in urban and rural locations rather than for
firms in concentrated and competitive markets. Based on the results in the second column of Table VII,
the rural/urban difference does not drive the results on concentration. The interest rate charged does fall
with age, however, the rate of decline is very similar in rural and in urban markets. For firms in an MSA
the coefficient on age is -0.240; for rural firms the coefficient is -0.154. The difference is not statistically
significant (t=O.6). Instead of market concentration being a proxy for the location of the firm (urban
versus rural), the location of the firm is a proxy for market concentration.
Finally, we test for the effect of state banking laws on the rate. The inclusion of an indicator for
unit banking states has little effect on the coefficient on age or the intercept in any of the markets (see
Table VII column Ill). Our results appear to be robust; controlling for other finn and loan factors, the
loan rates in the concentrated market start lower but do not fall as much with firm age as loan rates in
the competitive market (see Figure-Il).
II.Sundvorship Biasesin Different Credit Markets
Interest rates slope downwards with firm age because good entrepreneurs survive while bad
24entrepreneurs go under. It is, however, important for us to ask if differences in the survival rate of bad
entrepreneurs across markets could be responsible for the differences in estimated slopes across markets.
We assume in the model that bad types are all weeded out after one period. Thisensures that the
quality of surviving firms at date-I is the same in all markets, even though lower quality finnsare started
in the concentrated market. An alternative possibility is that the greater availability offinance for low
quality finns could make the attrition rate lower for bad finns in concentrated markets. Yet another
possibility is that competition in the product markets may be fiercer in areas with competitive loan
markets. Under the assumption that age proxies for unobservable elements of firmquality, we would find
demanded interest rates fall less with firm age in concentrated markets,
Clearly, unobservable quality should be correlated with observable proxies for quality. Table I
provides little evidence that surviving old firms in concentrated credit markets are of lower quality. The
mean and median firm size and growth rates for old firms (firms greater than 10 years) is about the same
in both competitive and concentrated markets though median profits —butnot mean profits —arelarger
in the competitive markets. It is possible that most low quality finns have been weeded in all marketsby
the time firms are 10 years old. If differences in attrition rates are to explain the relativeslopes of the
interest rate with age, much of the difference in attrition rates should occur when firms arevery young
(because we have empirically documented a much steeper decline in interest rates with firmage for very
young firms in competitive areas). We subdivide young firms into the very young (age less than 5 years)
and the not so young (age greater than 5butless than 10 years). If differentia] attrition lakes place when
firms are very young, the not so young firms should look much healthier in the competitive market. The
evidence (not reported in table) does not support this. The not so young firms in the middle market
dominate or tie with similar firms in competitive markets on all four dimensions of quality (median size,
gross profits, net profits, and sales growth). The not so young firms in the concentrated market are the
same size as those in competitive markets, have higher net profits but lower gross profits and sales
25growth. None of these differences are significant at standard levels!3 Interestingly, size,whichis the
variableleast likely to be mismeasured,isapproximatelythesame at $ 121.000 across the markets. While
we hesitate to dismiss differential survivorship as an explanation for the different slopes — note, however,
that itwouldnot explain the differences in intercepts or the differences in availability — we do not find
evidence supporting it.
ILL Discussion
Young tirms in concentrated markets receive more institutional fmance than do similar firms in
competitive markets. As firms get old, the difference in the relative firms borrowing from institutions
disappears. Young firms who get institutional loans are more indebted in concentrated markets than in
competitive markets but this pattern reverses for older firms. Creditors seem to smooth interest rates over
the life cycle of the firm in a concentrated market, charging a lower-than-competitive one when the firm
is young and a higher-than-competitive rate when the firm is old. We now discuss possible interpretations
of this result.
The results do not arise because firms in concentrated credit markets are very different from firms
in competitive credit markets, since they persist even after we correct for the obvious finn and industry
characteristics (see Tables IV and VII). In fact the sample of all firms in the different markets do not look
very different (Table I). One possible explanation of our results is that banks in concentrated markets
misprice their loans. But our results require them to be inconsistent in their mispricing, being excessively
eager to lend to young, little known firms and excessively cautious in lending to older, established firms.
While we cannot rule out this possibility, it is hard to think of plausible assumptions that would lead to
such behavior. It is also possible that concentration is a proxy for other factors. It may be easier for snnll
firms in rural markets to get credit, simply because lenders have better information about borrowers in
a small community where news, and gossip, travel fast. The problem with this explanation is simply that
ease of information acquisition cannot be the whole story, else firms in concentrated markets should enjoy
26uniformiy lower rates independent of age. In addition, the results are not altered when we controldirectly
for whether the firm is located in a rural area.
We think the most plausibleexplanation isthe theoretical one provided in section I. Creditors in
concentrated markets have an assurance of obtaining future surplus from the firm and consequentlyaccept
lower returns up front. This enables many more firms to be financed before the nominal interest rate rises
to the point where the possibility of moral hazard forces the lender to cut off credit. Ofcount, banks
in concentrated markets lend with the expectation that they will recover the initial subsidy viahigher
interest rates in the future. This explains why the surviving, older firms in concentrated marketspay
higher nominal rates than surviving older firms in competitive markets. Finally, the naturalresponse of
older firms who have few investment opportunities and are faced with higher interest rates is touse less
external fmance. This would explain why older firms in concentrated markets rely on internal opposed
to institutional finance.
There is a legitimate concern whether our findings are applicable to larger enterprises. The
economic forces we have identified, however, are not special to small enterprises. While the main source
of competition for a bank in the sample we examine is other banks, competition to fulfill the financing
requirements of larger firms comes from ann's-length sources like the commercial paper, equity, and
bond markets. The relative cost of borrowing from banks rather than markets is likely to be high for
large, reputable firms [see Diamond, 1991, Rajan, 1992]. It is even less likely that banks will be able
to retain the business of successful firms when competition is from arm's-length markets than when
competition is from other banks. Therefore, a natural consequence of the opening up of arm's-length
credit markets is that lending relationships deteriorate, young firms are more liquidity constrained, and
banks are less willing to help their.clients in financial distress?'
It is, however, easy to draw the wrong welfare implication from these findings. The absence of
credit-market competition is only one way firms and creditors can share future surplus, and it is not
27costless. The higher interest rate paid by successful survivorfirmsin concentrated markets can be
distortionary and force them to reduce their reliance on external funds. This may affect their investment
and reduce their rate of growth. There are contractual ways of ensuring bilateral commitment between
leter and borrower which may be less costly. For example, in addition to lending, the creditor could
take an equity stake in the young or distressed firm." While an equity claim would give the lender a
share in the future surplus generated by the firm, explicit contracts (as opposed to implicit contracts
enforced by the environment) have the added advantage of being voluntary so that firms whose incentives
would be excessively distorted by sharing future surplus would not enter into them.
Of course, it may not always be possible to promote relationships via contracts. Equity contracts
may not commit entrepreneurs to a credible payout policy. Creditors may not want to hold equity because
it makes them 'soft' when dealing with errant borrowers [see Dewatripont and Tirole 1992]. Owners may
be reluctant to give the bank equity because they may fear too much bank interference. A bank may be
less inclined to monitor the firm on behalf of, and act in the interest of, other fixed claim holders (like
employees and other creditors) if it also holds equity claims. A political concern is that banks may
effectively bypass anti-trust laws if they build substantial equity holdings in similar companies. Clearly,
it is an empirical matter whether these costs outweigh the benefits from stronger relationships, and our
study has nothing to say about this.
It is interesting to speculate on the policy implications if the only way to promote relationships
is by restricting credit-market competition. In the early stage of a country's economic growth when there
are comparatively few established finns, the availability of finance is most important. It may be least
inefficient to restrict inter-bank competition in order to achieve this?' But as many firms become
established, the distortionary price.for credit becomes a more important sowce of inefficiency. At this
point, dc-regulation and introducing more inter-bank competition, as well as opening up arm's-length
markets may make the most economic sense?' Clearly, the period before an anticipated liberalization
28will be troubledasrelationships breakdown before the benefits of competition kick in. But thismaybe
unavoidable for an economy that wants to optimize the trade-off between theavailability and the price
of credit.
The general point the paper makes is that competition and long-termrelationships are not
necessarily compatible, whether the markets being analyzed are labor or capital markets. Reformers in
relationship-based economies are not always right (as suggested by Mayer [1988]) if they think that
adding a dose of competition to their systems will necessarily make it better off. Conversely, itmay be
equally wrong to expect firm-creditor or firm-worker relationships to be as strong or valuable in the
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311. The basic argument dates back, at least, to Schumpeter who proposed that a monopolistic economy
offers betterincentivesfor innovation because an inventor can recoup her investment in R&D through
future rents. Mayer [19881 introduces this problem to the finance literature discussing the general inability
of finns and creditors to commit to a mutually beneficial course of action. Fischer [1990] models the
problem posed by competitive credit markets formally and suggests that a way for a firm to commit to
sharing future rents with the bank is to givethelatter an informational monopoly. Rajan [1992] argues
that even the bank's information monopoly may be insufficient to bind the firm when competition comes
from arm's length markets.
2. The Economist [November 13, 1993, p 84] describes the problem as follows:
•. .banks remain unable to charge prices that reflect the high risks of lending to small companies. Stan-
ups are especially risky; not only do plenty of them fail, but those that succeed tend to exploit their
success by refinancing their debt more cheaply.... One big British bank reckons that to make a profit
today it would have to double interest margins on its loans, from an avenge of three percentage points
over the base rate. That might provoke the government to intervene.
So banks are looking for other ways to boost returns from borrowers that succeed. Some, such
as Midland, would like to take small equity stakes. Others talk of introducing a clause into loan
agreements that would give the bank a one-off fee if a borrower wanted to refinance its debt. Customers
are understandably unkeen."
3. Bad entrepreneurs are the incompetent, the lazy, and the dishonest in the population of potential
entrepreneurs. The incompetent invest in the wrong projects and consequently waste the investment, the
lazy do not put in effort and see their investment wither away, and the dishonest steal the money or
extract excessive private benefits from the firm.
4. In a more detailed model, we could motivate debt as a way of extracting cash from entrepreneurs,
as for example in Hart and Moore [19891, or the optimal contract in a costly state verification setting as
in Diamond [1984].
5. See Myers [1977] and Hart and Moore [1989] for a discussion of the difficulties in writing such
contingent contracts. -
6. The first inequality in (AS) limits the number of cases we have to examine and does not change
the qualitative implications. In a more detailed model, M could be the outcome of a bargaining game.
7.Our model is functionally identical to Becker [19751. Our competitive credit market is his general
training. Our concentrated credit market is his specific training.
8. In other words, the firm borrows short term each period. Clearly, the firm could borrow at date
0 and spread repayments between date 1 and date 2. Since the discount rate is 0, this has no effect in the
model and is omitted for simplicity. Of course, we allow for the fact that the good entrepreneur may not
have enough cash to repay the loan at date 1.
9. Note that the bank has no inàentive to forgive debt (so long as expected cash flows are enough to
meet the contracted repayments) at date 1, since there is no moral hazard or adverse selection problem
at date 1.
3210. This is because the rent on the hinds lent conditional on the
risky project succeeding is (M-1)[I1
- D1)J which using (A.!)and(A.2)is easilyshown to exceed the rent on the hinds lensfor continuingthe safe project (M-1)[115 -(5, - This result holds much more generally. Allwe need for it to go through is that the bank receive a larger amount fromprojects which have higher NPV (net
present value). This would happen if the firm expands and directs more business towardsthe bank, or
if the bank uses its bargaining power to extract some of the additional NPVfor itself.
11. The bank cannot commit to lending at date 1, else the badentrepreneurs waste even more money.
Furthermore, a loan commitment contracted at a high rate will not workas the firm can always decide
not to take it down.
12. Finns involved in the agriculture, forestry, andfishing industry; finance and insurance
underwriting; or real estate investment trusts were excluded front thesurvey. Firms were initially sent
a series of work sheets which listed the financial information whichwas going to be collected by the
questionnaire. The work sheets were followed up by a telephone interview.
13. We classify commercial banks, savings and loans associations,savings banks and credit unions
as banks. Finance companies, insurance companies, brokerage or mutual fundcompanies, leasing
companies and mortgage banks are classified as non bank financial institutions. We alsohave loans made
by non-financial firms. The remaining loans consist of venture capitalist loans(surprisingly few), loans
from government agencies and otherwise unclassified loans.
14. Hannan provides evidence that the market for bank commercial loansis local in nature —
specifying which market the firm is in helps explain the rate charged. The unit ofdescribing markets in
his study is the Metropolitan Statistical Area. In our study, the unitcan either be the Metropolitan
Statistical Area or the county.
15. We are assuming stationarity of the survivalprocess so that we can indeed draw correct
inferences about changes in borrowing and interest rates withage from a cross-sectional sample. This
assumption is not required when we test differences across markets holdingage constant.
16. When we consider only firms which have obtained institutionalfinancing the differences seem
to widen. The mean size of such firms inmost competitive markets is almost twice thesize of such firms
in the most concentrated markets ($1,444,327 in competitive markets and$768,868 in concentrated
markets)andthe difference is significant at the 5 percent level. The medians are alsodifferent, $170,000
versus $l49.000, and this difference is significant at the 10 percent level. The meanoperating profit to
asset ratio is higher in the competitive market (0.58 versus 0.42) while themean sales growth is also
somewhat higher (0.34 versus 0.30) despite the fact that the firms in thecompetitive credit market are
larger.
17. Clearly, the annualized rate is not that high if firms are allowed to stretchrepayments beyond
the due date. Conversely, it may be much higher if firms miss the discount butpay before the due date.
Since the stated terms in an industry may differ from actual industrypractice, Petersen and Rajan (1994)
construct empirical measures of tIle actual period for which finns can borrow if they do not avail of
discounts. To estimate the potential stretch available to trade credit borrowers,they calculate the
difference in the DPO between firms that regularly take the earlypayment discounts and those that do
not. Foreachindustry, they determine the median DPO for firms that take less than 10 percent of the
discounts they are offered and the median DPO for firms that take more than 90percentofthediscounts
33offered. The difference between these two numbers is an estimate of how long finns that do not take
discounts stretch out their payments. For the retail industry it is 8.9 days. Based on the standard terms,
firms that do not take the discount are paying an additional 2 percent for 8.9 days of credit, which
translates to an annualized interest rate of 123 percent.
18. Whydotrade creditors lend when financial institutions are reluctant to lend? Trade creditors may
have a better ability to dispose of the collateral, greater incentives related to the margins they make on
the product they are selling, greater leverage over the firm because of their ability to cut off supplies,
or greater information about the firm [see Mian and Smith 1992]. Trade credit is presumably very
expensive because firms are not in the business of lending, though this merits further research.
19. As of June 1986. there were five remaining unit banking stales: Colorado, Kansas, Montana,
North Dakota, and Wyoming. Texas was a unit banking state till 1985.
20. Some states limit branch banking without having unit banking laws. if we expand our indicator
variable to include states with limits on branching, the banking law coefficient rises from 9.4 to 12.9.
The coefficient on the Herfindahl index, however, is unchanged.
21. While Table V suggests that the structure of the credit market does influence the availability of
credit to firms, it does not suggest that the difference in availability across market structure is
substantially different for young and old firms as our model would indicate. As we see from Table II,
much of the difference in debt levels across markets is for firms four years or less in age. In a
concentrated market, the median (mean) discount taken by such firms is 75 (60). In a competitive market,
the median (mean) discount taken by such firms is 50 (52). So the difference in medians is 25 and the
difference in means is 8. In comparison, consider firms older than 15 years. In a concentrated market,
the median (mean) discount taken by such firms is 100 (78.5). In a competitive market, the median
(mean) discount taken by such firms is 100 (78.3). So the difference in medians is 0 and the difference
in means ii 0.2. While we have increased the power of the test (and the economic difference) by taking
more extreme groupings, the difference in availability across market structure for young and old finns
is still not statistically significant.
22. The results indicate that as compared to firms in the most competitive market, firms in the most
concentrated market pay lower interest rates when young and higher rates when old. One way to verify
that this finding is not a result of our functional form is to examine the raw data. The evidence in Table
VI continns our intuition. Another way to check our results is to graph the residuals by age for both the
most concentrated and the most competitive markets. When we do this we find no evidence of
mispecification.
23. As might be expected given the similar distribution of industries across markets, industry
adjustments do not affect these results. When we subtract the median value of sales growth for all firms
having the same two digit S.I.C. code from the sales growth number and then find means and medians
across markets, the differences (or the lack of them) are qualitatively similar. This is true for net profits
and gross profits also. We adjust the assets by dividing them by the median in the industry. Again the
results are qualitatively similar.
24. The evidence from the Japanesc liberalizations seems to support this view. Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharlstein [1990] find that firms with relatively high growth and high Tobin's q reduced their bank ties
to borrow from the markets. This suggests that the relatively high quality firms left the banks to borrow
34from the markets. Furthermore, the Economist reports that while banks wereinitially eager to lend to
small firms to replace the business lost to the markets, they were now charging theman exorbitant rate
thus hitting the firms that borrowed at the wrong moment, and crimping theirplans for new investment"
[The Economist. October 27, 1990, p74].
25.Thatthe sale of an equity stake to the lender helps a firm share surplus with it in times ofdistress
has been put forward as one explanation of how the German universal bankingsystem evolved. According
to this view, the current stakes of German banks in large German firms are not part of acarefully planned
strategy, but a historic accident. The German banks acquired their stakes when they helped ailing German
firms out in the 1920s and 1930s (The Economist, November 16, 1991, p102).
26. Governments do actively restrain competition in the financial sectors in theearly stages of a
country's growth, though these restraints tend to take on a life of their own. Macrae 11990] hasan
entertaining description of the operation of the old government-sponsored bank cartels. Meerscbwam
(1991] describes the product market segmentation in lending implemented by the Meiji Restoration in
1868. Subsequent to the attempts to introduce more competition during the U.S.Occupation after World
War II, government guidance reasserted itself through the Ministry of Finance and the Sank ofJapan.
He argues that until the opening up of the bond markets, "specialized fmancial institutions,operating in
well-defined product markets... limited financing alternatives for the various corporations. Inaddition,
a lack of price differentiation among products reduced the incenti''e for participants to break these
relationships. -
27.This discussion presupposes that governments have a choice in deciding when to deregulate their
financial systems. For some countries like Japan, the decision has been partly forced becauselarge
companies went offshore to tap Euromarkets [see Meerschwain 1991, p. 1351. In other countries, the
wealthy vested interests set up by cartelization will successfully oppose liberalization.
35Table I
Sumniary statisticsfor I,tins classifiedby age and aedit market concentration













Firm solicited by 0.3210 0.32 026 0.46' 0.39 0.31
financial instititution 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
duringthe year (1 yes) (0.46) (0.47) (0.44) (0.50) (0.49) (0.46)
166 488 966 112 516 972
Firm size (in $l000s) 863 1074 569 1296 1692 1171
Book valueofassets 102 108 103 151 207 155
(3247) (7188) (1836) (2722) (5379) (3062)
179 517 1010 117 554 1027
Grossprofits 2.78' 2.18 1.88 2.39' 1.95 1.79
Assets 1.61' 1.24 1.06 1.36' 1.66 0.97
(2.96) (2.46) (2.21) (2.76) (2.31) (2.21)
170 491 965 114 520 973
Ooeratin2orotits 1.14 1.05 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.64
Assets 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.23)0 0.14 0.13
(4.84) (5.74) (2.49) (1.19) (1.93) (2.88)
170 491 965 114 520 973
Salesgrowth 0,30 0.32 0.31 0.15 0.15 0.14
(1986-1987) 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.03
(0.98) (0.92) (0.91) (0.63) (0.68) (0.58)
140 435 843 109 495 934
Number of iristics. from 135 1.40 1.37 1.28' 1.36 1.43
which firm borrows 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(039) (0.62) (0.62) (0.51) (0.65) (0.69)
99 291 655 71 323 624
Longestbusiness relation 4.10' 4.66 4.75 16.37 16.42 17.42
with financialinstitution 4.00 4.00 4.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
(in years) (3.09) (2.93) (2.95) (9.81) (10.60) (11.05)
179 517 1010 117 554 1027
36The S.B.A. survey classifies the Metropolitan Staristicaj Area
or county where the firm is he quartered into three categories on the basis of the commercial bank deposit Herfinlahl index of
the area. The most competitive marketsare those with a value of the l-lerfmdajij index of less than 0.10. The
most concgzgnsed market are those with a Herfiadahi index of more than 0.18. The middle market are those nwkets where
the Herfindahi index is between 0.10 and 0.18. Young firms are ten years old (the median age) or less. Oldfirmsare more than ten years old. We report themean, the median, the standard deviation, and the number of observations in each cell.
For each variable we tested the equality of the means in themost colientrajeti and most competitive markets. We tested the equality of the medians in the most concentrated and
most competitive markets using the Wilcoxon Rank. Sum test. Both tests were done sepaiaiely for
young and old firms. Differences in the means and medians is noted for significance levels of 10 percent (10),5percent C),and1 percent (').
37Table 11
InstitutionalIndebtednessof Small Finns





















































































































































Finns are classified by the concentration of the creditmarketswherethefinn is located and by
the age ofthefinn. Firm age is years since acquired by the present owners.TheSBAsurveyclassifies
the Metropolitan Statistical Areaorcounty wherethefirm is headquartered into three categoriesonthe
basis ofthecommercialbankdeposit Herfindahi index of the area. The most competitivemarkethas a
Herfindahiindexof lessthan0.10,andthe most concentrated market has a Herfindabi index ofmorethan
0.18. The debt toassetratio includes only debt frominstitutionsinthe numerator.Loans from owners
and family are not included.
38Table III
Trade Credit Usage Across Credit Markets with Differing Degrees of Competition
Most competitive
nurket




















Fraction of firms taking less than 10 percent of the discounts 0.33 0.29
(1232)
Fraction of firms taking more than 90 percent of their discounts 0.50 0.52
0.19
The most competitivemarket has a Herlindahl index of less than 0.101 and the most concentrated market hasa Herfindahl index of more than 0.18. Days PayableOutstandingis 365 I Accounts Payable / Cost of Goods Sold.
39Table IV
Credit Availability andtheRole of Credit MarketCompetition
































































Debt from Irnancialservice 2.54 2.11 3.37 3.51
provider (percent) (5.74)(5.75)(6.03)(6.03)



















1-ferfindahl > 0.18 (0.1)
Herfindahl C 0.10(0.1) 11.48
(10.35)
Number ofobservations 1459 1459 1339 1339
-Log likelihood 4120.14119.73743.03742.4
The dependent variable is the percentage of offered early payment discounts taken by the firm.
The coefficient estimatesarefrom a tobit regression with two sided censoring. 15 percent of the
observations are censored at 0 percent; 45 percent of the observations are censored at 100 percent.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The regression also includes seven industry dummies, three region
dummies, and a constant.
Coefficient is significant at the 1. percent level.
$ Coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level.
' Coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level.
40Table V































We tested the equality of the mean percent of earlypaymentdiscounts taken in the incas concentrated and most
competitive markets. The zest is done separately (or young (finns less than or equal to tenyears old) and old finns(finns greater than ten years old). Differences in the uam are noted for significance levels of ID
percent(10),5 percentfl. and 1 percent(I)
41Table VI

















Most concentrated market 11.38 11.04




The S.B.A. survey classifies the MetropolitanStatisticalArea or cou'dy where the finn ii headquartered into three
categories on the basis of the commercial bank deposit Herfindahi c( the area. The most competitive markets are
those with a value of the Herfindahi index of less than 0.10. The most anrated market are these with a Herfindahl
index of more than 0.18. Young firms are ten yeats old (the median age) or less. Old finns are more than ten yeats old.
We report the man interest rate, the standard deviation, and the number of observatioia in each cell.
42Table VII
The Evolution of Borrowing Costs Across Market Structures
Independent Variable I in
Credit Market Conditions
I-ierf,ndahlgreater than0.18(0,1) -I.285'° j34710
(0.686) (0.690)
Herfindahl between 0.10and0.18 (0,1) -1.704' -1.759'
(0.721) (0.724)
Log offirm ageif1-ferfindahi is 0.IM10 ..0153l0
greater than0.18 (0.088) (0.088)
Log of firm age if Herf,ndabl is -0.135 -0.134
betweenolOand 0.18 (0.127) (0.127)
Log of firm age if Flerfindahi is -0.725' -0.732' lessthan 0. 10 (0.273) (0.273)
Logof firm age if firm is in an MSA -0.240'
(0.112)
Log of firm age ii firm is not in an MSA -0.154°
(0.090)
Interestrate variables
Floating rate loan (0.1) -0.477' -0.459' -0.479'
(0.187) (0.188) (0.187)
Prime rate 0.278' 0.272' 0.277'
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Term structure spread o.oi 1 0.014 0.010
(0.084) (0.085) (0.084)
Default spread 0.357' 0.364 0.352'
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
Firm characeristics
Log(Book value of assets) -0.295' -0301' -0.295'
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Total debt/book assets -o.oi 1 .0.024 -0.003
(0.147) (0.148) (0.148)
Firm is a corporation -0.158. -0.173 -0.159
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145)
Number of banks from which farm borrows 0.379' 0378' 0.377'
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Firm is in an MSA -0.021 0.074 -0.031
(0.138) (0.343) (0.139)
Firm is in a unit banking state .0.213
(0.244)
Loan isfrom a bank(0,1) 0A00 0.140 0.107
(0.193) (0.192) (0.193)
Loan is from a non-financial farm (0,1) -1.148' -1.140' -L144'
(0.367) (0.367) (0.367)
Numberof observations 1277 1277 1277
AdjustedR2 0.160 0.154 0.159
43The razequotedon the tirm's most recent loanis thedependentvariable. The regression also includes seen
industry dummies, three regional dummies, six dummy variables for the type of assets with which the loan is
collateralized. and an intercept. The prime rate is the raze as the time the loan was made. The term structure spread is
the difference between the tO year government bond yieldandthe 3 month t-bil yield ax the time the loan was made.
The default spread is the difference between the BAA corporate bond yield and the tO year government bond yield at the
time the loan was mad&
Coefficient is significant at the I percent level.
'Coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level.




byDeposit Ikrk.t Concentraf Ion
Firms are classified by their one digit SIC code. We graphed the percent of finns in each industry for each of thedeposit
marker concentrations: mosc competitive (Herfuidahi index less than 0.1), most concentrated (Herfindahi indexgreaser
than 0.18), and the middle market.
45
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The loan razes are based on esumases from Table VU.A]]variables, except the run? s age and the market type (most
competitive vs. most concensnled) were set equal to the sample means. The average loan rise in this sample is 11.1
percent.
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